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Methods of theory building are rare in science. Particularly in social sciences, the competition 
between qualitative and quantitative schools has always been prevalent, even in discussing theory 
building. Another method that has been neglected for decades, even though its application is 
discussed the most of all social science’s classics1, is Dialectic Materialism (DiaMat) as method of 
theory building. The DiaMat has been developed by Karl Marx, adopted by a wide range of Marxist 
theorists and broadly discussed and criticized in its epistemological function by scientists all over 
the world. Its fruitfulness and usefulness for social theory building will be outlined here and it will 
be demonstrated that the method is not yet complete. In identifying the gap, this paper aims to both 
give a state of the art at a new methodological frontier and reveal crucial points on which further 
method debate should focus. 
 
Introduction 
In social sciences in general, in environmental social sciences in particular, just very few holistic 
theories exist. These are basically the system theory of Niklas Luhmann and Marx’s theory of the 
fetishism of commodity. Usefulness of creation of such a ‘sociology of things’ (Grundmann 1997), 
which can frame all areas of social science’s research, refers to a basic theoretical gap: The 
inclusion of non-social objects of research and the overcoming of sociologism frame without falling 
back to a naturalism paradigm. In the writings of the early Marx, a possible solution is seen (Groß 
2001: 38, Dickens 1992) in recognition of what is pointed out by Schmidt. The latter stressed, that 
Marx didn't go into a „Resurrektion der Natur“ [resurrection of nature] anymore, when it came to 
his later writings about the critique on political economy (Schmidt 1971: 159). 
In appreciation of values for a method of theory building, focus has swung between qualitative or 
quantitative preference. Giving certain weight to one or the other, approaches received greater 
importance when looking for mixed methods. The best known method of theory building is 
Constant Comparative Analysis and its application to Grounded Theory (Glaser/Strauss 1973). 
Glaser and Strauss demonstrate how to generalize qualitative data in order to develop good theory 
in a bottom-up manner. Methods of theory building with quantitative methods of data collection 
                                                 
1
 cf. Groß 2001: 33, footnote 3 
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have always been simpler to apply. This is since quantitative data collection is the way to test 
developed theories within a determined frame of questions. Basically the development of a theory 
itself doesn’t emerge with a certain quantitative method of theory building, but top-down hypothesis 
testing in several case studies, even comparisons enable forecasting of generalized statements which 
can perform good theory. In distinction from top-down versus bottom-up approaches, DiaMat as a 
method attempts theory development from abstract to concrete in terms of logic step-by-step 
derivation. Hereby, laws of logic create the criterion, in which theory is constructed. The principles 
of this method start with an abstract set of facts which are distinguishable by contradictions. The 
solution to the contradiction must consistently lead to the next instance of resulting arguments. The 
newly created instance of arguments frames a new set of facts in which the contradiction isn’t only 
resolved but new contradictions within the set call for further processing. This process is known 
from Hegel’s triad of dialectic (thesis – antithesis – synthesis). Whilst philosophical idealism is 
grounded on abstract creation of reality (or the world) through thoughts, channeled by the Welt 
Geist, the materialist (Mat) part of Marxist assumes a given frame of reality, which exists 
independently from individual’s perception. Epistemologically, DiaMat seeks to reveal the 
managing structure beyond societal symbolism. Herein, Historical Materialism (HistoMat) is the 
basis for the analytical frame. Methodologically, in particular for the purpose of theory building, 
materialism limits the development of theory to what has been or can be observed in the 
surrounding world. Nevertheless, the materialism – idealism is an artificial discussion since a 
(philosophically) materialist world view is established in all sciences: Both quantitative 
questionnaires and even qualitative free unstructured participant observations assume the world as 
something that is real and can be observed. 
Consequentially, what characterizes the advantages of DiaMat as a method? First of all it is a 
method to apprehend political entity in their momentum instead of stagnation. Furthermore, the 
researcher himself as possible source of research results biases in the process of data collection is 
constrained in the frame of logic. And here is the basic problem: The lack of a fully developed 
functional dialectic that does not rank behind the modern logic of science (Göhler 1980: 19). One 
could argue that the convenience of such a dialectic theory of science had to be doubted due to 
significant expressiveness of the modern logic of science. In the following examination, DiaMat as 
method will be described by using Marx’s examination of the fetishism of the commodity in the 2nd 
edition of the Capital. Hereby, the gap in a fully functional dialectic as method will be revealed by 
showing the extent that Marx was forced to reduce the dialectic in order to fit the frame. The 
remaining problem is in the resolution of the logical derivation contradictions, which will be 
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outlined at the end. 
Dialectic as a method of theory development 
Based on Lenin’s2 thesis, Marx’s Capital is applied logic, dialectic and epistemology. From this it 
follows that dialectic is the epistemology of Marxism. (Kimmerle 1986: 343, Göhler 1980: 7) 
Current differentiation between objective and subjective dialectic (Bochenski 1962: 87) create 
categories and criteria of an epistemological method of dialectic materialism. 
Limitations 
The explanatory statement to demarcate scientifically dialectic idealism cannot be sufficiently 
discussed 3. As Marx points out, Hegel sees “the life-process of the human brain, i.e., the process of 
thinking, which, under the name of 'the Idea', he even transforms into an independent subject, is the 
demiurgos4 of the real world, and the real world is only the external, phenomenal form of 'the 
Idea5.'” (Marx 1976: 102) He himself thinks the contrary. “[T]he ideal is nothing else than the 
material world reflected by the human mind, and translated into forms of thought.” (Ibid) 
The same applies to issues such as whether the definition of dialectic as a method can be appointed 
in advance (Ibid: 12), the differences between 1st edition and 2nd edition of the Capital, or if Karl 
Marx as the developer of dialectic materialism can be categorized under Engels’ definition6 of 
dialectic materialism, which must also be excluded.  
To the first point is to say, that even though Marx never wrote a book about dialectic as a method, 
his letter to Maurice La Châtre7 gave clear evidence regarding his intentions. There, he insisted on 
the fact that he was the first person to have applied this method to a study of economics. (Marx 
1976: 104) Therefore, for the purpose of the presented examination, one can assume that this 
application has been meant to be a methodological contribution to a dialectic method development. 
Lenin stated in that context that although Marx had never written his projected short treatise on 
dialectics, he left the Capital as an application. (Lenin 1960: 319) Ernest Mandel adds in his 
introduction to Marx’ Capital, that even Engels shared Lenin’s opinion (Marx 1976: 19). Dialectic 
can be characterized in opposition to Hegel by the “differentia specifica of capital-relation” (Ibid: 
17). The specific difference of the capital – work relationship is the source of the DiaMat as a 
                                                 
2
 Vladimir Iljitsch Uljanow 
3
  As Fichte’s approach in Reisinger (1987) or Baillie/Lichtheim (1967) 
4
  Creator 
5
  the Absolute Idea 
6
 Engels (1955) turned Marxism into a more speculative and metaphysic direction with a special methodological grounding when trying to include the 
nature in total. (Bochenski 1962: 22) For more details see Kaufmann (2012: 52 et seq.). 
7
  La Châtre was the editor of the first French edition of Capital Vol. I. 
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method and will therefore be the focus of this argumentation. 
Regarding the second is to say, that the changes from the 1st to the 2nd edition are mainly 
characterized by the exclusion a ‘bridging chapter’ between development of the value form (VF) 
development and the development of the exchange process (EP). One can see this rather as 
acknowledgment of his failure to resolve the dialectic problems which appeared in the process. For 
the purpose of this paper, the examination of the principle problem of DiaMat method of theory 
building is central8.  
To the final entity is to say that Engels’s approach to dialectic is not even similar to the one of 
Marx. Due to his metaphysical nature science materialism focus (Bochenski 1962: 22), his approach 
is very different from the one of his colleague. Hereby is to point out, that this understanding of 
dialectic is close to the understanding of Stalin9 whilst Lenin can be seen in continuation of Marx 
(cf. Bochenski 1962). When referred to Engel’s remarks to dialectic, basically his ‘three laws of 
dialectic’ from his work ‘Dialectic of nature’ (1955) are named. The limitation of dialectic as 
epistemological method cannot be grasped as path to further method development. This conclusion 
is an untested proposition, but his nature scientific attempts to ‘prove’ that the laws rather point to 
empiricism rather than to a dialectic argumentation to deduce the named laws. 
The issue and its ideal type procedure 
Each theory development and consequently its method start at the beginning. Hereby, Descartes 
first rule in his ‘discourse on methods’ (1637) was to “never to accept anything for true which I did 
not clearly know to be such; that is to say, carefully to avoid precipitancy and prejudice, and to 
comprise nothing more in my judgment than what was presented to my mind so clearly and 
distinctly as to exclude all ground of doubt. “ (Descartes 1946: 15) In consideration of Marx’s 
holistic theory social theory of interaction domination, his doubt starts with the exploitation of men 
by men and the question how this exploitation is hidden by society superstructure. Answer is given 
by the Fetishism of the Commodity and Its Secret. This is constituted by the development of both 
the fourth form of value and the exchange process, by which new logic levels must be achieved 
immanently by the statement’s coherence. (Göhler 1980: 17) This is the congruency with Hegel’s 
dialectic: Hegel’s dialectic method based on parturition of an idea out of itself. DiaMat as a method 
that requires compilations that follows exclusively from the development of ‘commodity – money – 
                                                 
8
  Where objectively adequate, the paper will refer to the first edition severally. 
9
 Iosif Vissarionovich Dzhugashvili 
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capital’ on the basis of a structural comprehension of capitalism and result in the estrangement10 of 
work hidden by the fetishism of commodity. Required is a deduction of use value11 (UV) and 
Exchange Value12 (EV) to the Exchange Process on the one hand and of all four value forms13 to the 
money form on the other. Historic evidence must remain external, just as part of the concretion, not 
the abstraction, and therefore must not be part of the argument’s derivation itself14.  
In the following, dialectic as a method will be characterized and classified by distinguishing 
between subjective and objective dialectic. 
Objective and subjective dialectic 
Central for the dualism of dialectic is the differentiation between movement apart and movement 
inherently, here called objective and subjective dialectic. Movement apart or objective dialectic is in 
approaching substandard assumptions of a >thing<15 in its dialectic movement and conclusion, 
which also implied conditionality to other >things< around it. Movement inherently or subjective 
dialectic is the approach of the approach. This means the application of dialectic based on the laws 
of logic as a methodological – parenthetic approach of itself. According to Bochenski (1962: 87), 
the research of objective dialectic is the analysis of nature’s laws whilst subjective dialectic centers 
on the laws of thought. 
Comparison of objective and subjective dialectic is outlined in four categories by Göhler: (a) 
Reality’s character of commodity16, (b) Reality’s character of processing17, (c) these – antithesis – 
synthesis18 and (d) Being and phenomenon like the opposition of the named categories of objective 
dialectic by their following pendant of subjective dialectic: (a) Advancement of abstractness to 
concreteness19, (b) coherence by transition20, (c) dialectical and logical antagonisms21, (d) discovery 
of the (real) being behind the (superficial) appearance22. (Göhler 1980: 11) The first named four 
categories have been used to create the second, which now frame the paradigm, in which the 
development of the fetishism of commodity must consistently be deduced23. 
                                                 
10
 German: Entfremdung cf. Marx (1976): 558 and Marx (1986): 455 
11
  Substance of Value, Magnitude of Value 
12
 EV is also sometimes known as just ‘Value’ in some contexts. 
13
 Simple Form of Value, Expanded Form of Value, General Form of Value, Money Form 
14
 The dialectic deduction can allude to a historic chronology. Scientific rigor of dialectic only forbids its total accordance. 
15
 like Hegel’s Absolute Idea 
16
 Totality, all-embracing context 
17
 movements of its own, historical becoming, lawful development, change in qualitative steps, transformation of quantity into quality and vice versa 
18
 Positive and negative elements, antagonism, interpenetration of opposites, dynamic by negation and antagonism 
19
 System, circling argumentation, concreteness of illustration, unity of analyze and synthesis, induction and deduction, means science as productivity 
20
 Dynamic of term and theory, precise deduction of issues’ development, logical and historical elements of illustration 
21
 of productive force (Produktivkraft) 
22
 science as critic 
23
 Over objections in regards to the goal, some may argue that Marx developed the fetishism of commodity in the Capital before discussing the 
exchange process. As short response ex ante is to say that the proposition of Göhler as well as this paper of a reduction of dialectic bases on the 
fact, that in his first publication (>A contribution to the critique on political economy<) exchange process and value form deduction has been 
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Subjective Dialectic using Marx’ example 
So, subjective dialectic is the approach of the approach when using DiaMat. In consideration of 
Göhler’s outlined categories of subjective dialectic, we must see – methodologically – even these 
categories as an application of the dialectic method. This means, when applying dialectic as method 
of theory building to another issue similar categories in accordance to logic reasoning would have 
to be developed as well. 
In the next two sections, the two deductions will be analyzed in regards to Marx’s early and later 
writing: The first section will concentrate on the exchange process24 and the deduction of use value 
(UV) and exchange value (EV). The second section will deal with the money form (MF) deduction. 
Therein, the transitions within the outlined dialectic deductions will be discussed. Both sections will 
separately look into the way how the two chosen works of Marx, >A Contribution to the Critique on 
Political Economy< [further on: >Critique<] and the >Capital, Vol. 1, 2nd edition< [further on: 
>Capital], conduct the dialectical argumentation. 
Basically, the ‘early’ economical writings of Marx like the >Critique< among others (1951, 1970, 
1973, 1975) attempted to develop the fetishism of commodity by parallel development of money 
form (MF) and exchange process (EP). In comparison, the later writings, beginning with the Capital 
(1976, 1986), Vol. 1, 1st edition, tried to develop both the required MF and EP consecutively. In the 
first edition of the Capital Marx phrased a bridging chapter to connect MF and EP. In the second 
edition he dropped it, but presented the money form (MF) as only logical result of the analysis of 
value forms (VFs). (Ibid: 55) This change from parallel to consecutive deduction is called in 
accordance to Göhler (1980) and also adopted in this title the ‘reduction of dialectic by Marx’. 
In the following, central differences will be described. The starting point is the distinction between 
UV and EV. Here, the chicken-egg-dilemma25 as will be discussed in order to show the unresolved 
problem of emphatic dialectic in the >Critique<. The problem appears among other problems in the 
process of EP deduction. Hereby, Marx failed in deducing the EP consistently in a parallel structure 
of a complete emphatic dialectical frame. In avoidance of the contradiction, which led to the named 
failure, Marx changed the way that the deduction is conducted and – consequentially – the structure 
of the argumentation itself. Even then, he started with the EV-UV distinction, but moved the 
deduction of the EP to the next chapter. Based on an implied formulation of EV-UV distinction, he 
                                                                                                                                                                  
conducted at the same time. 
24
 The selection of these three aspects bases on the topical proximity of Hegel and Marx in regards to their Arbeitswertlehre. As Göhler wrote, Marx 
has coquetted with primarily Hegel’s theory of the value (1980: 15). 
25
 This goes back to Aristotle who wrote that “[i]f there has been a first man he must have been born without father or mother – which is repugnant to 
nature. For there could not have been a first egg to give a beginning to birds, or there should have been a first bird which gave a beginning to 
eggs; for a bird comes from an egg.” (Fénelon 1825: 202) This refers to the principle law of logic, which forbids proving an argument with its 
contrary. This means, that causal connection of chicken and egg cannot prove each other right as they require each other for their existence. 
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deduced the forms of value and realized the fetishism of commodity. After that, he deduced in 
consideration of the outlined results the exchange process. This procedure in turn gave more space 
for dialectical criticism in his line of arguments than before. Since almost all have read Marx 
heritage in terms of its epistemological and theoretical heritage, in non-recognition of his 
methodological contribution, this topic has been underestimated and negligently ignored. Most of 
Marx critiques are based on his political assumptions and come from different political viewpoints. 
More profound critiques are rare. Göhler’s critique is an exception. Here, unfortunately, is no space 
to discuss his conclusion controversially. For a summary and some arguments against Göhler’s 
conclusion see Kaufmann (2003: 29-31). This discussion will concentrate on the methodological 
arguments, which explain the claim of a ‘reduction’ in the >Capital<. In the same sequence, 
problems of the transmission when deducing the four value forms will be outlined in consideration 
of above named category b). In recognition of category c), the analysis will look for consistency and 
self-destructive negation of arguments and notion constellations26. The exchange process will reveal 
both the named chicken-egg causal dilemma for consistent deduction of the fetishism of commodity 
and the logical contradictions when deducing the EP. This category also applies to the analysis of 
the transmissions. According to category a) and d) one may assume relevance of historical evidence 
for the deduction of arguments. This must be refused in advance. The classification applies to the 
movement of dialectical argumentation [a)], to say something about surrounding materialist reality. 
So, DiaMat theory development must not rely in the deduction of material or concrete arguments, 
but on the deduction from contradiction as they appear in former construction. Regarding the last 
classification [d)], the discovery of the fetishism of commodity must be understood in terms of the 
aim to reveal the overall binding social structure of societies. In fact, Marx aims to give evidence 
that labor27 time is the general exchange commodity of social relation. It is not only the source of 
surplus production, but also the variable to discover the exploitation of men by men. Analysis of the 
fetishism of commodity is associated with the analysis of the estrangement of work28, which is 
hidden by the fetishism of commodity. Discovery of a being behind the appearance rather describes 
movement and goal of deduction and is not establishing somehow metaphysical laws of dialectical 
deduction. 
                                                 
26
 This must be seen as subjective dialectical adoption of the negation of negation procedure in the thesis-antithesis-synthesis procedure of objective 
dialectic.  
27
 This word is intentionally used, since work means in the context of his terminology something else as will be described below. 
28
 This word is intentionally used, since labor means in the context of his terminology something else as will be described below. 
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Exchange Structure: The deduction of the exchange process 
As mentioned, the distinction between the two values as part of one and the same commodity is the 
starting point of both argumentation ‘versions’ (>Critique< and >Capital<). Differences are the 
logic status of the UV-EV distinction within the argumentation. Whereas the >Critique< inherently 
includes the distinction when deducing the EP, the >Capital< splits distinction and EP deduction 
into two completely separated parts. The separation doesn’t only appear in difference of >Capital<’s 
structure but also in application of DiaMat method, so subjective dialectic itself. 
The exchange process describes the process of commodity exchange, in which the commodity 
changes its value from UV to EV of one owner and EV to UV (in this order!) of the owner of the 
second commodity. Since this applies for both commodities (as it applied to both owners), the 
deduction of the exchange process (EP) must be performed in accordance to the outlined frame (cf. 
p. 7). In totality, generality of exchange processes is expressed by the term of exchange structure 
(ES). 
>Critique< 
Marx starts the development with the antagonism of exchange value (EV) and use value (UV), 
pointing out the two characteristics of each one commodity (1986: 100; 1976: 180). Each of these 
characteristics is split into two aspects. The first aspect is the doubling of all commodities into EV 
and UV. The second aspect is the double character of manpower29. This is distinguishable into a 
concrete-adjuvant part called ‘labor’ and an abstract-universal called ‘work’. The former part 
(labor) is connected to the EV whilst the latter (work) links to UV. EV becomes evident as a societal 
production’s proportion30. This identifies EV as a quantitative (adjuvant-concrete) proportion of use 
values. Hence, it is the crystallizing of manpower and appears as a societal substance. The UV on 
the other hand is the qualitative (abstract-universal) identification; different manpower’s 
proportions are referred to each other as equal, arranged by the EV. Even though required to 
demonstrate the dialectical and logical antagonisms [c)], the doubling leads to the first contradiction 
problem. The deduction problem bases on the requirements of emphatic dialectic31: The 
identification of commodity divided in UV and EV does not include a contradiction’s formulation 
within. Considering the double doubling, another problem is added to the existing: The dual 
                                                 
29
 This notion is chosen in order to not confuse the argumentation with the two distinguishing terms of ‚labor‘ and ‚work‘. Consequentially, 
‘manpower’ means in this context the joint definition of ‘work’ and ‘labor’. 
30
 Gesellschaftliches Produktionsverhältnis 
31




identification of the EV as quantitative and the UV as qualitative doesn’t constitute self-destructive 
antagonisms (Göhler 1980: 51) by itself but would make a differentiated analysis necessary (ibid: 
50). Even without the second doubling, and taking UV and EV as to contradictive sides of the same 
coin, the contradiction does not appear from its original form automatically as it should in order to 
move on. In consideration of the second doubling, the mentioned negation [category c)] in terms of 
a resolution in the process of EP deduction doesn’t become evident and is not the result of Marx’s 
examination. Possible linkages to historical forecasts of a possible resolution of this contradiction in 
terms of manpower-capital antagonism by communist revolution cannot help for the DiaMat 
method to fulfill the requirement, as Marx’s approach is to deduce the forms of value and the 
exchange process parallel. Therefore neither one nor the other deduction can rely on the result of 
the other but must be fully deduced by its own in a consistent manner. As Göhler points out, Marx 
developed commodity, money and exchange process continuously on the level of the exchange 
process (Ibid: 54). In consequence, UV and EV are part of the exchange process. As said, this is the 
process, in which two commodity owners are exchanging (or willing to exchange) two 
commodities. Herein, each commodity changes the value in the process of exchange to the extent 
that the EV of the commodity of one owner becomes the UV of the other owner. The same vice 
versa happens to the other commodity at the same time when the exchange takes place. To the 
named two contradictions comes now a third one: UV and EV are requiring each other in the 
procedure of exchange. This applies in a double meaning. First, one commodity must be expressed 
vice versa by UV and EV in itself and second, it must be expressed by both UV and EV of the 
commodity with which it is exchanged at the same time. Therefore, and opposite to the stated 
requirement of emphatic dialectic, the deduction of the UV-EV distinction doesn’t base on the 
identification of UV and EV notions, but UV and EV accounts for each other. This means that both 
require the exchange process (EP) to be realized (Ibid: 58), even if the EP should be the result of 
UV and EV. The explicative contradiction problem is followed by a logical32 one: The EP aims to 
equate commodities for quantitative purposes (EV), but also aims to differentiate the same 
commodities qualitatively (UV) at the same time. (Ibid: 59) Logical incoherence appears even the 
relationship of EV and UV in regards to the commodity owners is consistent. (cf. Ibid: 60-62) 
Concluding, it must be stated that deduction of ES fails due to its explicative contradictions. 
Requirements as announced the emphatic dialectic as a method therefore aren’t matched. Instead of 
an implication, the initial identification just indexes the contradictive formulation.  
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In the >Capital<, Marx didn’t use the explicative function of contradictions for the deduction. 
Thereby he avoids the problem of contradiction as it has appeared in the >Critique<. Instead, he just 
gives a prefixed distinction of UV and EV without addressing the EP issue there. From there he 
starts with the simple form of value (form I), also called the cell form or – Hegelian – the In-Itself 
of money. In the following Marx deduces the forms of value to the money form (form IV) 
consistently. 
The Exchange Process (EP) is developed after finishing the development of the forms of value. 
Principally, the exchange of commodity is deduced in the Capital without phrasing antagonisms 
(Ibid: 65). The mentioned doubling of commodities in exchange value (EV) and use value (UV) is 
understood as an >interior doubling< whilst the splitting up of commodities in the exchange process 
is conceived and classified as >outer doubling<. Due to the argumentative parting, the descriptive 
contradiction remains, but doesn’t become obvious.  
The true character of the relation can be revealed when looking at the implicitly expressed exchange 
structure of use value of commodity a (’UVa’) becomes (’-’) exchange value of commodity a (EVa) 
and is realized (‘=>’) in the UV of commodity b (’UVb’): 
UVa – EVa – UVb 
The descriptive contradiction is the excepted qualitative difference of UVa and UVb.33 On the other 
side they are in a societal proportion, which means that they are both based on labor and 
qualitatively equal. This circumstance also suggests a logic contradiction. (Ibid: 68) 
Another structure-theoretical problem appears in the logical status of the contradiction’s 
reproduction. Since emphatic dialectic would require a necessarily argumentative and dialectical 
deduction of appeared contradictions, the parallel realization of the contradiction’s deduction of 
value form and exchange structure (ES) as base of a restructuring argumentation had to be acquired 
again. Therefore, the splitting could help making descriptive contradictions invisible, but could not 
resolve the contradictions themselves. 
Conclusion 
The absolute problem in both >Critique< and >Capital< can be found in the deduction of ES and 
money form (MF). As general structure, the fetishism of commodity requires both parts to be 
                                                 
33
 The reduction (because not phrasing) of antagonism applies non-constraining just because the value form is not reflexive, symmetric and transitive. 
The explicative function of the contradiction is reversed. (Ibid: 69) 
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complete, as Marx has assumed at the beginning in the >Critique<. The deduction of money is 
consistently conducted by the forms of value in >Critique< and >Capital< (see below), but the 
exchange structure (UV-EV-UV) is mainly generated by the developed EP. Herein, the problem 
appears in both ‘versions’, better hidden in the >Capital< as there emphatic dialectic was replaced 
by descriptive contradiction formulation. Even if the results of the value forms and ES deduction 
are logically consistent in itself, problems appear just by bringing them together. Any combination 
reveals a logical problem of descriptive contradiction due to the reciprocal conditionality. (Ibid: 83) 
Commodity and money: The deduction of the money form 
Marx initiates the deduction of the four value forms by sensual manifestation of the capitalistic 
commodity’s production. As Göhler stresses, the structure of value form deduction is similar in 
>Critique< and >Capital< (1980: 88-89). Based on structure theory [Strukturtheorie], explications 
are congruent. Marx uses commodity, use value (UV), exchange value (EV) and value as root-
equitably [Grundgleiches]. (Göhler 1980: 45) Therefore, no distinction between the two 
publications is necessary in regards to the initial assumption.  
For analysis purposes, three archetypes, which were used by Marx in order to deduce the VFs to the 
money form, must be referred to. Three dialectical approaches can be distinguished: 
(a) dynamic explication 
(b) reconstruction of facts 
(c) reconstruction of expanded and differential structures off essential ones34 
 
Above differentiation is crucial to the following investigation. The dialectic character of the 
deduction must become obvious within the process of genesis, negation (self-destruction), and 
transitions to the next value form (VF), where the negation of the negation appears. 
The transitions from simple form of value to the money form 
In the first place, the transitions’ analysis deals with the question, how transitions from first to 
second, from second to third, and from third to the last form of value have been deduced 
dialectically. A separate examination of the transitions in the >Critique< is not necessary, since the 
deduction problem, in particular to the money form, appears in its parallel development with the 
exchange process in terms of the chicken-egg dilemma (see above). Nevertheless, the transitions 
                                                 
34
 Logical problems of antagonism must not pose either the sequence of single structures in itself or the dichotomy of its elements. 
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exist, but the weight of the argumentation is far lower in the >Critique< since arguments can also 
always rely on the achieved deduction level of the EP. In the >Capital<, on the contrary, the entire 
deduction of the fetishism of commodity bases on the deduction of the VFs. As stated by Marx in 
chapter 1.4 of the >Capital<, the EP requires the MF (form IV) to be properly deduced and to 
establish the Fetishism of the Commodity (Marx 1976: 163). 
Transition of form I to form II 
Form I does not differ basically from form II. The simple form of value (form I) contains  
x commodity a = y commodity b 
and is just extended to relative form of value (form II):  
x commodity a = y commodity b form = z commodity c etc. 
This extension describes just an all-sided circulation of commodities and of reciprocal exchangeable 
things. From dialectical viewpoint, the antagonism of a commodity, which is both equal and 
different to another commodity, is not resolved. In default of exposure the descriptive antagonism 
does not become obvious.   
Transition of form II to form III 
Form III constitutes an inversion of the value form structure. The relative value form (form II) of 
x commodity a = y commodity b form = z commodity c etc. 
is inverted to the general value form (form III):  
u commodity a     
v commodity b      
w commodity c                
x commodity d     
y commodity e     
etc.     
Further concretion is achieved by replacing also the variables by >real< commodities such as ‘20 
yards of linen’ as general equivalent (GE) [Allgemeines Austauschäquivalent], which is opposed by 
the sum of all other commodities.  
x commodity a 
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The converse and carry back from second to third VF couches a new qualitative level in the 
development of the forms of value. This new level is the decisive structure in the deduction of the 
VFs (Göhler 1980: 131). Comparison of the commodity equivalent and lots of commodities in a 
relative form can show the comparability of different commodities. Hereby, the common societal 
character as spent and palpable embodiment of manpower becomes obvious. The comparability 
results from the concept of value without being the concept itself. 
Deducing the exchange structure (ES) this way resolves a basic problem of dialectic development of 
the form of value and the ES. Göhler, on the other side, shows that the ES accrues only when 
inverting the concept of values. Regarding the circulation of the commodities’ exchange, deduction 
of C-C to C-M-C35 accrues only after the above named double inversion (1980: 133). Furthermore, 
open questions are, inasmuch the deduction from expanded (II) to general value (III) form has 
reached the possible limits of inversion. This means, it is an unproven assumption that further 
inversion of value form III cannot provide a more of concretion or a resolution to the descriptive 
contradiction. Another open question is, whether the deduction of the GE can be constituted as an 
all-embracing relationship of commodities. The difficulties in the process of GE constitution are in 
its functionality as sum of all commodities and all excluding commodities and set of all 
commodities (Ibid: 96). Further unanswered questions are in the combination of ES and VF, which 
will be discussed in the next chapter in detail. The combination and its inversion are consistently 
not educible due to an unproven one-sided loading on the use value (UV) instead of an equally 
loaded emphasis on both UV and exchange value (EV). Consequentially, the basic structure of 
Expanded and Simple value form did not change, since the structure expressed as C-M or C-M-M-C 
is also consistently not educible. (Ibid: 136) 
However, the central characteristic, the becoming of the concrete in this transition, becomes 
evident. The value concept of single commodities is not arbitrary or randomly after the deduction of 
form III. Therefore, the general form is common to all commodities and >real< in consequence. 
Transition of form III to form IV 
As outlined, form III constitutes in concretion an inverted form to express the GE. The concretion is 
realized by replacing x commodity a by ‘20 yards of linen’ of the general form: 
 
                                                 
35
 Commodity – Commodity to Commodity – Money – Commodity 
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1 coat     
10 lbs. of tea      
40 lbs. of coffee                
1 quarter of corn     
2 ounces of gold     
x Commodity a, etc.     
to its final structure, the money form (MF) or value form IV: 
1 coat     
10 lbs. of tea     
1 quarter of corn     
40 lbs. of coffee    
20 yards of linen     
x Commodity a, etc.     
The mentioned result of a consequentially >real< form of value form III becomes obvious when 
looking at the transition to the forth VF, the money form (MF). In terms of DiaMat deduction, there 
is no transition at all. The general equivalent of ‘20 yards of linen’ is replaced by the GE of ‘2 
ounces of gold’, argued in further concretion as ‘₤ 2’ as GE, but not by further deduction. Evidence 
is provided by historical-empirical identification and not – as required – by inherent antagonisms of 
the defined General value form. It is a historical fact that money as general currency was 
established and became the General Equivalent (GE) in replacing all other possible and existing 
(gold, gems etc.) exchange commodities. This is methodologically the only evidence, which 
constitutes the transition from form value III to the money form. Even though historical-empirically 
verifiable in terms of an ontological development36, a dialectical deduction is neither source 
(negation) nor product (negation of the negation) of the procedure. Furthermore, the MF cannot 
reveal a new identification of the reality. So, besides a failure of DiaMat deduction, even a more of 
concretion [cf. category a) above] in the dialectical development is missing. In conclusion, value 
                                                 
36
 This is true in terms of a logically expatiated definition. 
‘20 yards of linen’ 
‘2 ounces of gold’ 
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form IV is a logic consequence of historical facts and therefore undeniable. In terms of logical 
coherence in the deduction of new dialectical quality, it cannot provide anything new and must 
therefore be seen as a causa ex ante. More concretion must lead to the MF as required step to the 
fetishism of commodities, but must appear as logical result of the foregone value forms. 
Chicken-Egg dilemma: Money and the Process of Exchange 
The money form (MF) finally provides the money concept. When looking at the resulted concept in 
comparison to the exchange process (EP), another contradiction becomes evident. Generally, the 
two inherent values of commodities are forced into equalization. Hereby, one commodity is 
quantitatively the same in terms of an equivalent amount of productive labor that was spent to 
create it (EV). On the other hand, the same commodity is differentiated qualitatively by its use 
value (UV). This non-coherent linkage appeared already as logical contradiction. Here, two possible 
ways out exist: First, money must be deduced from EP as obvious solution. So, it must be deduced 
as conclusion from former contradictions by resolving the named logical contradiction. Second 
option would be to avoid the contradiction of the EP. Then DiaMat methodological deduction had to 
demonstrate that the money concept can be logically achieved without the exchange structure (ES). 
>Critique< 
As mentioned above, in the >Critique< the most obvious attempt is undertaken: Money is 
developed on the basis of the EP. The problem appears in its functionality as being always EV and 
never UV. This formal problem had to be resolved in order to create consistent parallel deduction of 
money with reference to the EP. Marx gives the EV a bigger weight in regards to the reflection 
possibility within the exchange relationship (Göhler 1980: 90). Without the pre-prove, which shows 
that such an one-sidedness in aid of the UV cannot show further cognition, the EV emphasis cannot 
satisfy. Here, this asymmetry is objectively necessary concerning the money concept, since the one-
sided UV loading disables another deduction than money (Ibid: 100). In accordance to formal rigor 
[wissenschaftliche Strenge] this argument cannot be convincing. 
Capital 
Opposite to the >Critique<, the >Capital< argues on an ex ante stated differentiation of values (UV 
and EV). Methodologically, the deduction of the all four value forms (VFs) is separated from this 
differentiation. The differentiation is just suggested to initiate the VF deduction. Consequentially, 
the realization of the exchange structure (ES) bases only on the deduction of the money form (MF). 
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The then existing ES enables the proper deduction of EV and UV, even one sided as said. This 
approach leads to inconsequence in the deduction of the EP (Göhler 1980: 105) as contradictions in 
the >Critique< are not resolved but softened and bypassed. Marx avoids the definition of 
contradiction in explicative function and specifies the contradiction definition until the historical 
level becomes obvious. On the then reached historical level (still) existing antagonisms are possible, 
but irrelevant (Ibid: 118). 
Conclusion 
As could be shown, the problematic historical level in >Capital< joins and turns the deduction to an 
argumentation due to the impossibility to deduce the EP in a consistent manner. This leads perforce 
to a reduction of dialectic. As Göhler argues further, this can also be seen as a departure from 
Hegel’s dialectical frame (Ibid: 123), even though the gradual VFs’ deduction reveals a rudimentary 
character of dialectical explication. At this point in time, the line between the ‘early’ and ‘later’ 
Marx must be drawn. 
Concluding conclusion 
The principle research question can now be answered. The extent to which DiaMat as a method is 
applicable or developable is complex. The distinction between subjective and objective dialectic as 
introduced by Göhler (1980: 11; cf. p. 7 in this text) is not just factually correct, but necessary to 
establish an application of dialectic as a method of theory building. The reduction of dialectic by 
Marx can be concluded as follows. 
Critique 
Marx fails in the >Critique< to develop MF and EP simultaneously, since the initial identification 
just admittedly indexed the antagonistic formulation what it had to imply. Evidence for the problem 
could be found in the transition from value form (VF) II to VF III. This transition is handled in the 
>Critique< as one step. Inter alia, it cannot be proven dialectically, why it is the general equivalent 
(GE), which is emanated from this identification. Marx constitutes the GE in the development of the 
exchange value (EV) identification, but not in the pulling together of the two value concepts. 
(Göhler 1980: 92) So, here the one-sided loading towards EV remains as open question, which he 
wasn’t able to resolve. 
Capital 
As said, this circumstance is more pressing in the >Capital<. The consecutive argumentation avoids 
 20 
 
contradiction at the first look, but reveals more pressing concerns regarding non-consistency of VF 
deduction, in particular form III and – most of all – form IV. Besides the transmission problem of 
the former form, it is still open whether the deduction of form III could be conducted stringently. 
For the sake of clarity, ‘development’ instead ‘deduction’ will be used to describe, how final 
structure is achieved in the >Capital<. Since Marx distinguishes by two parts when developing first 
the forms of value and then the exchange process (EP). The problem is that already consistent 
development of VFs creates problems due to unresolved contradictions. If the rules of scientific 
rigor have been sufficiently considered in the process of extension from form I to form II, and the 
inversion from form II to form III without testing the opposite issue37, is arguable. The money form 
(MF) finally breaks the whole argumentation archetype. The transition is neither an expansion nor 
an inversion but just a logical not constituted redefinition based upon historical facts. Therefore, at 
this point, DiaMat as a method cannot be found in the principles which should reason the deduction. 
Even more, DiaMat regularities aside, logical coherence considerations are waved at this point and 
leave the last form out of any context, methodologically. In conclusion, the argumentative 
coherence of both form III and MF is structural-analytically whilst they are in form and content of 
the argumentation are historical. The value forms’ asymmetry reveals evidence that commodities 
cannot oppose each other reciprocally, but only one-lined. Therefore, the exchange process (EP) in 
its final structure must be adopted in the argumentation in order to deduce the money form (MF).  
Prior deduction of EP however is not possible, since identification of UV-EV conception would 
require leastwise the Simple form of value (x commodity a = y commodity b). Prevention by 
deduction of both EP and MF at the same time, refers to the dilemma in the >Critique< (see below). 
Final remarks 
In regards to the analyzed transitions three archetypes of used methods in Marx’ argumentation can 
be allocated as followed: (1) The >Critique< applies exclusively the emphatic dialectic. In the 
>Capital< two archetypes are used: (2) A reduced dialectic is applied to develop the form I to IV of 
commodity whilst (3) the EP using dialectic as a ‘specific scientific coherency of explanatory 
statement’ (Göhler 1980: 125). All transitions are attributes of DiaMat deduction. They give 
evidence of explication and the reduction of dialectic. The deduction of the money form (MF) is the 
reconstruction of the commodity-money relationship, reduced to the simple value form and proving 
the coherency by incremental addition of relevant aspects. This expresses the character of Marx’s 
dialectical deduction. At the end, final remarks to Göhler’s primary determination for the 
                                                 
37
 Inversion of the Simple form of value, expansion of the Expanded form 
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explication of contradictions. Here shall be referred to announced critiques of the past of Göhler’s 
determined UV – EV relationship (1980: 68), expressed by  
UVa – EVa – UVb. 
(cf. p. 12) Göhler argued, that the “Umkehrung zwar möglich [wäre], aber dann auch für die relative 
Wertform, und das wird von Marx für die einfache Wertform ausdrücklich abgelehnt (K 765 f; K 63 
f)“ [inversion would be possible, but only if also applied to the relative value form, and this is 
refused by Marx in regards to the simple value form expressively] (1980: 64). The critique argued 
that possible determination without contradiction, expressed by  
UVa – EVa – EVb – UVb, 
must be inquired (Kaufmann 2003: 30-31). Furthermore, one might argue that mentioned imbalance 
in favor of EV might be reduced by this change in condition. In terms of logic, commodity is even 
more realized in the exchange value of commodity b (EVb) than it is realized in the use value of 
commodity b (UVb). Certainly, even if true, this would not resolve all problems which have 
appeared in the deduction process, but would be a possible starting point to continue within the 
frame of Marx’s theory frame. His provision of a holistic theory for social sciences, which can ( 
opposite to Luhmann’s system theory(1998)) be falsified and must therefore be identified as ‘good 
theory’ in terms of Grounded Theory (Glaser/Strauss 1973), would make it a very useful task to 
continue the debate. As Göhler considers, value form and exchange structure are both, taken by 
itself, logically compatible. Only when measured, a descriptive contradiction emerges due to their 
reciprocal conditionality. (1980: 83) 
For method discourses, Göhler’s examination must be seen as very useful structure. Problems and 
weaknesses in theory building can be named when applying his outlined translation of objective 
dialectic criteria to subjective dialectic. Nonetheless, DiaMat method must be seen at its beginnings. 
For methodological debates in terms of method development it opens a new field for fruitful 
debates. As application in consideration of ‘good theory’ building, DiaMat as method can be a 
useful tool, not just used independently, but also in combination to other theory building means. 
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Abbreviations 
EP  exchange process 
ES  exchange structure 
EV  exchange value 
EVa  exchange value of commodity a 
EVb  exchange value of commodity b 
GE  general equivalent 
MF  money form 
UV  use value 
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